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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

THE COMMON CARRIER OF GOODS: ITS LIABILITY
IN NEW YORK.

I.
The common law puts upon all common carriers the duty
skillfully to conduct their undertakings, and upon common carriers
of goods the more onerous duty also to insure goods delivered
to them for carriage against loss or injury not caused by the
excepted perils.' These are affirmative duties and breaches of
them are negative torts2 which were actionable before breaches
of contract were legal wrongs.8
When the conception of contract had developed, the failure
of any common carrier in its duty skillfully to conduct its undertaking was recognized and redressed as a broken contract, and
its tortious character less emphasized; and today perhaps most
actions therefor sound in contract, though the form of action
in this State does not matter if the complaint states a cause of
action. 4
Still every common carrier's failure in its undertaking is none
the less a tort.5 The practical questions are whether or not, and,
if so, to what extent, common carriers may by special contracts
with their patrons relieve themselves of these common law duties.
At an early day common carriers of goods in this State made
the attempt to obviate their duty to insure by notice that they
would not do so; and such a notice was held not to limit the
'Bissell v. New York Central Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 442, 445, per,
Selden, J. It is probably the law of New York that a common carrier
of passengers by steam train is an insurer of the roadworthiness of
its vehicles. Alden v. New York Central Railroad Co., 26 N. Y. 102.
See the remarks of Earl, C., in McPadden v. New York Central Railroad
Co., 44 N. Y. 478. This duty is not imposed upon common carriers
of passengers by any other instrumentality. Carroll v. Staten Island
Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 126.
"'A tort is disobedience to a command of the State, and is affirmative or negative, according as the command is negative or affirmative,
the tort being in that respect the converse of the command." Langdell,
Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 Harvard Law Review 659. Cf.
Keener, Quasi-Contracts, chap. I.
'See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harvard Law Review 1;
53; Bronson, J., in Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 239-240.
'Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 481; Nolton v. Western Railroad Corporation,
15 N. Y.-444; Carroll V. Staten Island Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 126.
Objections to'the contractual theory of the action encountered in Nolton
v. Western Railroad Corporation, 15 N. Y. 444, have been met by the
decision in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268.
'Nolton v. Western Railroad Corporation, 15 N. Y. 444; Carroll v.
Staten Island Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 126.
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goods carrier's liability, as insurer, whether brought home to the
owner of the goods or not.6
A few years later, the right of common carriers of goods to
stipulate away their insurance liability by special contract with
a patron to that effect, was denied on the ground that to uphold
a bargain of that character would be to hold out to these carriers
"* * * a premium for indifference or carelessness, or a want
of vigilance in protecting shipments confided to their care," and
"* * * every relaxation of the common law in relation to
the duties and responsibilities" of common carriers of goods was
declared "* * * to be founded in bad policy and detrimental
7
to the general interests of commerce."
Gould v. Hill was overruled a dozen years later," and the
right of a common carrier of goods by special contract to exempt
itself of its insurance liability was asserted as a "'* * * matter
in no way affecting the public morals, or conflicting with public
interests."9 This result is sound. The insurance liability of
a common carrier of goods, upon whatever theory it may be
accounted for, is an historical accident.10
There are, however, the soundest reasons of policy against
a contract relieving any common carrier of its duty skillfully
to conduct its undertaking. A patron does not deal at arm's
length with a common carrier, and it may well be doubted that
the ostensible bargain is a true contract."- In any event, since
the public welfare requires that every common carrier be held
'Cole v. Goodwvin, 19 Wend. 251 (1838); Hollister v. Nowlen, semble,

19 Wend. 234. "These decisions rest on the very satisfactory reasons,
that the notice was no evidence of assent on the part of the owner,

and that he had a right to repose upon the common law liability of the
carrier, who could not relieve himself from such liability, by any mere

act of his own." Per, Parker, J., in Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 11 N. Y. 485, 490.
"Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill 623, Per, Cowen, J., quoting the language of

Story, J., in The Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567, 575. Nelson, Ch. J.,
dissented.
'Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 11 N. Y. 485.
'Per, Parker, J., in Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navagation Co., 11
N. Y. 485, 493. Mutual assent was apparently found in the significant
character in a commercial community of the receipt given by the defendant carrier for the goods, and consideration in a judicially noticed
reduction in the rate at which the carrier was bound to transport them.
See Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 171.
"'Holmes, C. J., in Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329; The Common
Law, chap. V; Cf. Beale, The Carrier's Liability: Its History, 11 Harvard
Law Review 158.
'New York Central Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEw

to a strict performance of that duty, a contract that would
affect this public right adversely is against public policy and void. 12
Nevertheless, in this State it has been considered that the policy
in favor of freedom of contract overrides the policy favoring
every incentive to a common carrier to be careful in the prosecution of its public calling,"" and in 1877 the right of a common
carrier to "* * * stipulate for exemption from responsibility
for the negligence of himself or his servants" was said to have
been "* * * so repeatedly affirmed * * * that this question cannot with propriety be regarded as an open one in this
State."" The rule of construction, contra proferentem, is strictly
applied when such a contract is interpreted, and the carrier escapes
liability for negligence only when the stipulation against liability
therefor is found in terms in the bargain. 5
'The weight of authority in this country denies the validity of such
a contract. Hutchinson, Carriers (Mechem's 2nd ed.) Sec. 260.

Where a common carrier undertakes a gratuitous carrying there has

been no demand for a performance of its common law duty to be- skillful.
A contract limiting its liability for failure in such an undertaking accordingly does not operate to relieve it of that duty, and is objectionable
neither 'on the ground of duress nor of bad policy. It has so been held
in passenger carrier cases. Perkins v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
24 N. Y. 196; Ulrich v. New York' Central and Hudson River Railroad
Co., 108 N. Y. 80; Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S.
440. The same reasoning obviously applies to the gratuitous transportation
of goods, for the conveyance of goods without consideration is never
common carriage. See Saleeby v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 99
App. Div. 163; 184 N. Y. 597; Citizens' Bank v,Nantucket Steamboat Co.,
2 Story, 16.
The same result has been reached in cases of the conveyance, without

independent payment therefor, of one who accompanies his goods carried

for hire, on the ground that the person accompanying the goods is gratu-

itously transported. Bissell v. New York Central Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 442;

Hodge v. Rutland Railroad Co., 112 App. Div. 142; 194 N. Y. 570. Sed qu.

The dissenting opinion of Denio, Ch. J., in the Bissell case seems sound.
A common carrier's employee, when transported on a pass pursuant
to the contract of employment, although not a passenger, is not carried
gratuitously. Vick v.New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co.,
95 N. Y. 267; Dempsey v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad
Co., 146 N. Y. 290. An express stipulation on the pass so used against
liability for negligence would, therefore, be without effect on principle.
Even in New York it could have no effect: it would violate the rule
that a master cannot by contract with his servant exempt himself from
liability for harm done the servant by his negligence. Johnston v. Fargo,
184 N. Y. 379. See Gill v. Erie Railroad Co., 151 App. Div. 131, 135-136,
and the cases there cited.
'See the remarks of Earl, C., in Cragin v. New York Central Railroad
Co., 51 N. Y. 61, 64.
"Mynard v. Syracuse, Binghamton and New York Railroad Co., 71
N. Y. 180, 185-186. Per, Church, C. J. See the earlier cases there cited.
""Considerations based upon public policy and the nature of the carrier's
undertaking influence the application of the rule, and forbid its operation,
except where the carrier's immunity from the consequences of negligence
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A qualification announced in some of the earlier passenger
carrier cases, 16 the existence of which has several times been
squarely raised, but, apparently, nowhere fairly met, would withhold from common carriers the right to contract against responsibility for personal negligence. A late case repudiates the qualification.1 7 The repudiation is a dictum, but the effect of- the
decision, it would seem, is to render the distinction negligible
for practical purposes. The holding was that the negligent use
of a defective rail "* * * was that of the servants of the
defendant who relaid the rails and had charge of repairing the
track." 8
is read in the agreement ipsissimis verbis." Per, Gray, J., in Kenney v.
New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 422, 425,
where the cases are collected.
In the application of the rule no distinctions are made between the
so-called degrees of negligence: the carrier may contract for exemption
from liability for negligence in any degree. Perkins v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 196. It seems to be taken for granted that the
contract could not operate to relieve the carrier from liability for willful
misconduct. Anderson v. Erie Railroad Co, 157 N. Y. Supp. 740; 171
App. Div. -.
Irrespective of considerations of policy it would seem
that an agreement that the carrier should not be responsible for willful
misconduct, since it would obligate the carrier to do nothing, could not
be an enforcible promise.
'Perkins v. New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 196; Smith v.
New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 222; Bissell v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 442. The Smith case may be soundly
explained on the ground that, since the contract did not in terms exempt
the carrier from liability for negligence, it could not have that effect.
Note 15, supra. Ulrich v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad
Co., 108 N. Y. 80, where the negligence was assumed to be that of the
carrier, is not in point. The plaintiff in that case was being carried
gratuitously. Note 12, supra.
"Anderson v. Erie Railroad Co., 157 N. Y. Supp. 740; 171 App. Div.-.
'The decision is, therefore, against what has commonly been thought
to be the distinction.
"But nevertheless there is such a thing as negligence imputable to the
carrier, whether a corporation or not, as distinguished from the negligence
of its agents. For example, a railroad company is bound to provide a
road-bed, rails, ties, engines, cars, and appliances of all kinds, of the
best character and description that can reasonably be procured, and that
are by other railroad companies recognized as desirable and proper to
be used. It is not bound to try experiments, but it is bound to keep
up with the process of invention, as tested by experience, and if its
agents fail to fulfill the duty thus devolved upon the carrier, the breach of
this duty is treated as the carrier's personal negligence." Wheeler, Modem
Law of Carriers, 78.
In estimating the result reached in the Anderson case it should be
remembered that, since the intestate was a passenger, the derailment of
the vehicle was res ipsa loquitur; Edgerton v. New York and Hudson
River Railroad Co., 39 N. Y. 227;, Loudoun v. Eighth Avenue Railroad
Co., 162 N. Y. 380; and that the carrier is responsible for defects due to
the negligence of the manufacturers of the machinery or materials used
in the structure or operation of the road, whether discoverable by the
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Between a contract designed conventionally to limit the liability
of a common carrier of goods for failure in its duty skillfully to
conduct its undertaing, and a contract for an antecedent valuation of the goods at an amount beyond which the carrier is not
to be held in the event of loss of or injury to them, there is a
clear distinction. Contracts of the latter kind are soundly sustained
because they have no tendency adversely to affect the manner of
the performance by a common carrier of goods of its public
service duty to be skillful.V19 A contract for an antecedent valuation of the goods relieves the common carrier of liability in an
amount greater than the stated value where the loss of the goods
is caused by negligence, despite the absence of an express stipulation therein against liability therefor. 20 Indeed, under such a
contract, the common carrier is not answerable in any amount
over the agreed valuation even where the goods are stolen by
21

its employees.

exercise of due care on the part of the carrier's immediate agents or not.
Hegeman v. Western Railroad Co., 13 N. Y. 9.
Sec. 42' of the Railroad Law is a modification of the fellow-servant
doctrine and without significance in this connection.
"Tewes v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 N. Y. 151, and the
cases there cited. The owner's statement of the value of his goods should
bind him on plain principles of estoppel. See the remarks of Werner, J.,
in the Tewes case, p. 157. He is held to the stated value, however, on the
ground that he has contracted against a contrary attitude. Belger v.
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166.
Where the offer looking to a contract for such an antecedent valuation
of the goods does not move from the shipper, there is no contract therefor
for the want of mutual assent, unless that element of the bargain is
made out from the significant character of the receipt which the carrier
gives for the good&. See the dissenting opinion of Haight, J., in the
Tewes case; Note 9, supra.
That the shipper's promise to hold the carrier for nothing more than
the value announced is supported by a sufficient consideration will, it
seems, be assumed. All common carriers are required to file with the
Public Service Commission schedules of rates for the transportation of
passengers and property. Public Service Commissions Law, Sec. 28. Rates
thus scheduled are apparently judicially noticed to be lower than those a
common carrier could impose for performance of its common law duties.
Gardiner v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 201 N. Y.
387. The scheduled rates cannot be reduced in a particular case. Railroad Law, Sec. 37, et seq.; Public Service Commissions Law, Sec. 26,
el seq.
'Tewes v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 N. Y. 151.
'D'Utassy v. Barrett, 157 N. Y. Supp. 916; 171 App. Div. . An
effort to sustain contracts seemingly intended conventiohally to limit the
liability of a common carrier of goods as if they were contracts for an
antecedent valuation of the goods is to be noticed. Gardiner v. New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 201 N. Y. 387.
The New York common law doctrines upon the liability of a common
carrier for loss of or injury to baggage are dealt with in II for convenience.
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II.
The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Bill, amending the
Interstate Commerce Act,22 and the decisions of the Federal
Courts thereon, in so far as they regulate the liability of a
common carrier of goods for failure in an undertaking to perform an interstate carrying, supersede the New York common
2
law doctrines on that subject. 8
These New York common law doctrines as previously stated
operate today, then, only to define the liability of a common
carrier of goods for failure 'in its undertaking to perform an
intra-state carrying. And in this narrower field these common
law doctrines to a great extent have been modified by Section 38
of the Public Service Commissions Law. That statute provides :24
1. Every common carrier, baggage company, transfer
company, railroad corporation and street railroad corporation shall, upon demand, issue either a receipt or bill of
lading for all property delivered to it for transportation.
No contract, stipulation or clause in any receipt or bill of
lading shall exempt or be held to exempt any common
carrier,baggage company, transfer company, railroad corporation or street railroad corporation from any liability for
loss, damage or injury caused by it to property from the
time of its delivery for transportation until the same shall
have been received at its destination and a reasonable time
shall have elapsed after notice to consignee of such arrival
to permit of the removal of such property.
2. Every common carrier, baggage company, transfer
company, railroad corporation and street railroad corporation shall be liable for all loss, damage or injury to property caused by delay in transit due to negligence while the
same is being carried by it, but in any action to recover
for damages sustained by delay in transit the burden of
proof shall be upon the defendant to show that such delay
was not due to negligence.
24 U. S. Stat. at Large, 386, Sec. 20, as amended by 34 id. 593, 595,

Sec. 7; Id. 838, Res. No. 47.

"People v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 163
App. Div. 79; Barnet v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad

Co., 167 App. Div. 738, where decisions of the Federal Courts to the
same effect are cited.
"The section is here paragraphed and parts thereof italicized by the
writer. Independently of Federal legislation this statute does not affect
the liability of a common carrier of goods for failure in its undertaking
occurring outside this state. Shapiro v. Weir, 128 App. Div. 245 (failure
in freight carrying) ; Hasbrouck v. New York Central and Hudson River

Railroad Co., 202 N. Y. 363, 377 (failure in baggage carrying).
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3. Every common carrier, baggage company, transfer
company, and railroad corporation shall be liable for loss,
damage and injury to property carried as baggage whether
in connection with the transportationof the owner or not,
up to the full value and regardlessof the character thereof,
but the value in excess of one hundred and fifty dollars
shall be stated upon delivery to the carrier, and a written
receipt stating the value shall be issued by the carrier, who
may make a reasonable charge for the assumption of such
liability in excess of one hundred and fifty dollars and for
the carriage of baggage exceeding one hundred and fifty
pounds in weight upon a single ticket or receipt.
4. Nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of
such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of
action which he has under existing law.
Wherein has this statute modified the New York common law
heretofore stated?
(a) BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH.
It is undoubtedly still the law that common carriers of goods
may by special contracts with their patrons stipulate agaihst
their common law insurance liability.
Special contracts between a common carrier of goods and
its patron limiting the liability of the former for failure in its
duty skillfully to conduct its undertaking, are, it would seem,
prohibited. The phrase "by it" was probably not used by the
legislature with reference to the distinction between the carrier's
25
personal negligence and that of its servants.
The right of a common carrier of goods by special contract
with its patron antecedently to value the goods at an amount
beyond which th@ carrier is not to be liable in the event of loss
of or injury to them, is, it would also seem, not denied.
This paragraph probably does not apply to express companies.
It is addressed to "Every common carrier", and express companies are defined as common carriers.28 Yet these considerations are not controlling on the question. 27 The express company
is the modem substitute for the old wagon carrier and its route
28
runs from the door of the consignor to that of the consignee.
'See notes 16, 17, 18, supra.
'Public Service Commissions Law, sec. 2.
'Morgan v. Woolverton, 203 N. Y. 52, 56-57.
'Baum v. Long Island Railroad Co., 58 Misc. 34, 41-42 and the cases
there cited.
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Its liability, as common carrier, does not end when property carried
by it "* * * shall have been received at its destination and
of
a reasonable time shall have elapsed after notice to consignee
2
property.
such
of
removal
the
of
permit
to
arrival
such

(b) BY THE SECOND PARGRAH.
This declares the rule put down by early New York cases
that "*

*

*

A carrier who seeks to be excused for non-delivery

of goods caused by the act of God must show that no negligence
of his concurred in or contributed to the damage of the goods."3'
The contrary rule of the Federal courts by which the carrier
is excused although its negligence contributes with an act of God
has thus been stated: "*

*

*

Where the proximate cause of

damage to goods in the hands of a carrier is an act of God, the
carrier is excused from liability, although his own negligence or
delay may have contributed to the loss or damage as a remote cause
thereof." 3' 1 It has been suggested that this New York rule no
longer applies where the carrier would be excused for his failure
to deliver an interstate shipment in such circumstances, although
Federal legislation on the subject of interstate commerce does
not provide in the matter.3 2 The word "carried" here undoubtedly
has its legal comprehension and is not limited to the physical
movement of the goods.

33

The language quoted is declaratory of the common law rule fixing
the time at which the common carrier of freight becomes warehouseman.
Fenner v. Buffalo and St. Louis Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 505. See, Jones
z). Wells Fargo Express Co., 83 Misc. 508.
'Per, Howard, J., dissenting, in Barnet v. New York Central and
Hudson River Railroad Co., 167 App. Div. 738, 744-745, citing Michaels
v. New York Central Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 564; Read v. Spaulding,
30 N. Y. 630.
'Per, Howard, J., dissenting, in Barnet v. New York Central and
Hudson River Railroad Co., 167 App. Div, 738, 745, citing the Federal
decisions. See also, Denny v. New York Central Railroad Co., 3 Gray
(Mass.) 481.
Congress having taken over the whole subject of interstate
commerce, the rules of the Federal Courts developed before, as well as those
enunciated since, the statute, must control this subject-matter." Per,
Howard, J., dissenting, in Barnet v. New York Central and Hudson River
Railroad Co., 167 App. Div. 738, 744. The New York statute is not noticed
in the Barnet case.
-"Fenner v. Buffalo and St. Louis Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 505; see note 29,
supro.

The employment of the phrase "Burden of proof" is unfortunate in view
of the indiscriminate use of it by the courts to designate: (1) the burden of
establishing the proposition in issue; (2) the burden of going forward with
evidence at different stages of a trial. See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise.
Upon Evidence, 355, 368-371, 376-381, 383-389.
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(c)

BY THE THIRD PARAGRAPH.

By many New York common law decisions, "baggage" is
defined as a passenger's fair concomitant for comfort and convenience on his journey as determined by his station in life and
the purpose of the journey.3 ' By the same test is determined what
is personal paraphernalia properly retained by a passenger under
his own control within the passenger vehicle.3 5 The common
carriage of goods being a true bailment, the passenger carrier is
not an insurer of such paraphernalia; and apparently insures
baggage only until it is ready to be delivered upon the passenger's
demand. 8 Although the common carrier of baggage, like every
other common carrier, may by special contract with its patron
relieve itself of its common law duties skillfully to carry the
baggage and also to insure it until ready for delivery, an ordinary
railroad ticket could not contain such a contract.37
The third paragraph of the New York statute has, it seems,
no reference to a common carrier's liability for loss of or injury
to a passenger's paraphernalia kept with him in the passenger
vehicle, as distinguished from his baggage.
Read down to the saving clause, this paragraph would appear
to prohibit special contracts intended to limit a common carrier's
liability for loss of or injury to a passenger's baggage.
Does the paragraph apply to express companies? Does it
render the common law definition of baggage no longer important?
Is it a condition precedent to a common carrier's liability in
excess of one hundred and fifty dollars for loss of or injury to
'These cases are collected in the annotations to Sec. 66 of the Railroad
Law, Cummings & Gilbert's New York Consolidated Laws. Although this
concomitant may be baggage where the passenger does not go with it on the
same train, it is probably freight where he precedes or follows it so long
before or after it is checked that it cannot fairly be held to have been
intended by him for use on the journey. See Moffat v. Long Island Railroad
Co. 123 App. Div. 719.
-Weks v. New York New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 72 N. Y.
50; Knierem v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 146
App. Div. 661; 201 N. Y. 47.
"Gausman v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 63
Misc. 200; 134 App. Div. 989. The Gausman case would give a law definition
for a situation formerly dealt with as fact. Judicial legislation of this sort
had its ablest exposition in Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, per, Holmes, J.
'Rawson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 48 N. Y. 212, 217. But a railroad
ticket may be so formal an instrument as to contain a c6ntract. See Anderson v. Erie Railroad Co., 157 N. Y. Supp. 740; 171 App. Div. -;
Tewes
v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 N. Y. 151. An ordinary baggage
transfer check is not of itself a contract. Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264.
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baggage while carried by it, that the passenger state such excess
value upon delivering the baggage to the carrier?
As the statute was originally enacted" the third paragraph
did not contain the words "whether in connection with the transportation of the owner or not." That language was, however,
read into the paragraph by implication in a case holding the paragraph, in the words of the original enactment, applicable to an
express company.89 The Court of Appeals later took a contrary
view without noticing the earlier decision. 40 Then the statute
was amended 4' to incorporate into the third paragraph the phrase
"whether in connection with the transportation of the owner or
not." The language of the amendment probably was intended to
overcome the Court of Appeals decision in Morgan v. Woolverton
and to make the paragraph applicable to express companies. There
seems to be no other explanation for putting into the paragraph
expressly the very words the Appellate Division had by implication found there when it decided Meister v. Woolverton.
The Court of Appeals in Morgan v. Woolverton did not consider that the phrase "regardless ofk the character thereof" was
intended in any way to impair the fundamental idea behind the
common law definition of baggage.4 2 In Meister v. Woolverton
the Appellate Division plainly intimated a contrary conception
of the purpose and effect of that phrase. The force of Morgan
v. Woolverton as a precedent has been weakened by the amendment of 1913, and that of Meister v. Woolverton strengthened,
and so the question as to the present importance of the common law definition of baggage goes unanswered.
Must a passenger speak of the higher value of his baggage
if he would hold the carrier to whom he delivers it for transportation for more than the amount named in the statute when
the baggage is lost or harmed in transit? A lower Court has
decided that a passenger, from whom a carrier accepts baggage
without inquiring the value thereof, may recover the full amount
of damage thereto occurring in transit, although the passenger
does not state the value of the baggage upon delivery thereof
to the carrier and receives at that time, without dissent therefrom,
'Laws, 1907, ch. 429.
'Meister v. Woolverton, 140 App. Div. 926.
'Morgan v. Woolverton, 203 N. Y. 52.
"Laws, 1913, ch. 344.
"Per, Hiscock, J., 203 N. Y. at p. 55.

FORDHAm LAW REVIEW

141

a' non-contract check reciting that the value of the baggage is
limited to one hundred and fifty dollars. 4 Somewhat contrary
opinions of this situation have been expressed, 44 and the Court of
Appeals decision thereon is yet to come.
It is unfortunate that so many matters in the business of every
day intra-state common carriage of goods admit of no more
definite statement.
JOHN T. LOUGHRAN..
FORDHAm LAW SCHOOL.
3

' Dazey v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 150 N. Y.
Supp. 58 (Supreme Court, Appellate Term). See also, opinions of Miller
and Scott, JJ., in Robinson v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 145 App. Div. 391; 203 N. Y. 627.
"Gardiner v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 201
N. Y. 387; Dowling, J., dissenting, in Robinson v. New York Central and
Hudson River Railroad Co., 145 App. Div. 391. And so the Supreme Court
of the United States in construing a similar provision of the Carmack
Amendment. Boston and Maine Railroad Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, Mr.
Justice Pitney, dissenting.

